Fordham Law Review
Volume 84

Issue 4

Article 17

2016

The New Tate Letter: Foreign Official Immunity and the Case for a
Statutory Fix
Luke Ryan
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Luke Ryan, The New Tate Letter: Foreign Official Immunity and the Case for a Statutory Fix, 84 Fordham L.
Rev. 1773 (2016).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss4/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE NEW TATE LETTER:
FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
AND THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY FIX
Luke Ryan*
Our constitutional system was designed—and indeed works better—when
the President and his subordinates must answer to people who don’t work
for them, particularly those in Congress and the courts.1

Plaintiffs sometimes bring civil lawsuits in U.S. federal courts against
officials or ex-officials of foreign governments accused of committing
atrocities abroad. In these types of cases, the foreign individuals will
almost certainly invoke the affirmative defense of foreign official immunity.
In the 2010 decision, Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)—a 1976 statute
governing the immunity of foreign states—did not control judicial
determination of a foreign individual’s request for immunity. Instead, the
Court said that foreign officials may be entitled to immunity as a matter of
federal common law. Because of the sensitive foreign policy implications of
these types of cases, the executive branch—specifically the State
Department—has aggressively asserted control over all foreign official
immunity requests. In 2012, in the so-called “Rosenberg Statement” and
“Koh Letter,” the Justice Department and Legal Adviser to the State
Department, Harold Hongju Koh, declared that (1) federal courts must
refrain from deciding any foreign official immunity request that was not
first presented to the State Department and (2) it was for the Executive, not
the courts, to evaluate whether a foreign individual acted in an official
capacity.
While the Executive is certainly the branch of government with principal
responsibility for foreign affairs, the Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement
represent executive branch overreach into judicial supervision of a federal
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2002, University of
Virginia. The author is profoundly grateful to Professor Thomas H. Lee for his guidance and
encouragement and is especially thankful to a courageous team who gave him the
inspiration, joy, and resolve necessary to make this project a reality.
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword to MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS,
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISOR, at xvi (2010).
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lawsuit. Judicial deference to the Executive on foreign official immunity
calls may be proper; blind obedience is not. In fact, such unilateral control
ultimately hurts the State Department itself, which must balance complex
and countervailing foreign policy interests. So how should the Executive’s
power play be answered? Despite the Supreme Court’s reference to judgemade federal common law in Samantar, this Note argues that the tug-of-war
between the executive and judicial branches requires congressional action
because the courts are in disarray, with some already having acquiesced to
executive control. The current disorder is a striking replay of what
happened in the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity in the late 1950s
and 1960s in the aftermath of the 1952 Tate Letter—an earlier dispatch
from a different State Department Legal Advisor that sparked such
confusion in the federal common law of foreign sovereign immunity that
Congress was compelled to intervene with the FSIA. This Note concludes
with a model statute that Congress should consider enacting.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2008, under a nearly moonless night sky, ten members
of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group2 crouched aboard a small
dinghy as it moved across the inky darkness of the Arabian Sea.3 The men
had abandoned their homes in the mountain villages of Eastern Pakistan and
embarked on a one-way journey to the Indian coastline to “kill
relentlessly.”4 Stained with blood after murdering the crew of an Indian
fishing boat, the terrorists raced toward the darkened beach of the world’s
fourth largest city clutching automatic rifles, grenades, and satellite
phones.5 When their dinghy pushed ashore at a fisherman’s slum in
Mumbai’s Back Bay, they ran into the bustling commercial capital to
conduct one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks in history.6 Over the
course of four days, the world watched as Indian authorities scrambled to
counterattack, and the terrorists methodically killed 166 people.7
The Mumbai attackers were guided to their targets by the detailed
surveillance work of a U.S. citizen.8 For nearly two years, David Coleman
Headley had traveled around Mumbai, using a camera and pocket-sized
Global Positioning System (GPS) to discreetly gather information about the
Indian security apparatus and map out the scenes of mass murder.9 In 2009,
Headley was arrested in Chicago’s O’Hare Airport and charged with aiding
and abetting the murder of U.S. nationals.10 He quickly confessed to his
role in the Mumbai attacks.11 In interviews with American and Indian
authorities, Headley revealed that he and the LeT attackers had received
money and other material support from agents of the Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the secretive Pakistani spy agency organized
under Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense.12 Based on the information Headley

2. LeT is a Pakistan-based Islamic fundamentalist organization that has conducted
numerous attacks against Indian government and civilian targets inside both countries. See
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/
let.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/TX46-8EXP]. On December 20, 2001, LeT
was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Secretary of State pursuant to
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Individuals and Entities Designated
by the State Department Under E.O. 13224, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/
rls/other/des/143210.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/THK4-5SYR].
3. See CATHY SCOTT-CLARK & ADRIAN LEVY, THE SIEGE: 68 HOURS INSIDE THE TAJ
HOTEL 1–3 (2013).
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 3, 137; see also Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 338
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014).
8. See SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY, supra note 3, at 34; see also Government’s Position
Paper As to Sentencing Factors at 3–4, United States v. Headley, No. 09 CR 830 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 22, 2013), 2013 WL 951595.
9. See Government’s Position Paper, supra note 8, at 3–4; SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY,
supra note 3, at 55–56.
10. See Government’s Position Paper, supra note 8, at 4.
11. See id. at 7–9.
12. See id. at 8–9; SCOTT-CLARK & LEVY, supra note 3, at xvi, 45, 53.
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provided, the Justice Department issued an indictment against the ISI
official who Headley had identified as his primary contact.13
When the victims of the Mumbai attacks filed an action in the Eastern
District of New York against the ISI and two of its directors, the Pakistani
government asserted immunity and petitioned the State Department to
recommend that protection to the court.14 The executive branch obliged,15
and in the so-called “Rosenberg Statement,”16 it recommended dismissal of
the allegations against the ISI under the statutory doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity17 and dismissal of the allegations against the ISI
officials under the federal common law doctrine of foreign official
immunity.18 The statement declared that the immunity determinations were
binding on the court.19 More significant, however, was the second to last
page of the document, where the Executive asserted control over all future
foreign official immunity determinations when it wrote:
[I]t is for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine whether the
conduct alleged was taken in a foreign official’s official capacity.20

And,
[B]ecause a foreign state’s request for immunity on behalf of an official
itself has foreign relations implications, courts should ensure that the
Executive Branch has been notified of and had an opportunity to consider
such a request before ruling on the immunity issue. Indeed, for that
reason, a foreign state’s request for an official’s immunity should first be
presented to the Department of State, not to the court.21

These controversial assertions highlight the disarray that currently exists
regarding determinations of foreign official immunity by the courts.22
Unfortunately, this discord is not easily resolved because the doctrine of
foreign official immunity involves the competing responsibilities of the
13. See Second Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Kashmiri, No. 09 CR 8304 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2011), 2011 WL 1938505; Government’s Position Paper, supra note 8,
at 9.
14. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d
sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014).
15. See id.
16. Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity, Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba,
980 F. Supp. 2d 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 10-CV-05381 (DLI)), ECF No. 35 [hereinafter
Rosenberg Statement] [perma.cc/JW9C-AUNL].
17. Foreign sovereign immunity is synonymous with foreign state immunity.
18. Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 2, 7.
19. See id. at 1 (“[T]he Department of State has determined that the former Directors
General of the ISI . . . enjoy immunity, a determination that is not subject to judicial
review.”).
20. Id. at 9–10.
21. Id. at 9 n.5.
22. See infra Part I. Previously, the Executive had merely claimed “the primary role in
determining the immunity of foreign officials” without making such an explicit assertion of
total control. Statement of Interest of the United States at 5, Yousuf v. Samantar, No.
1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011), aff’d, 699 F.3d 763
(4th Cir. 2012) (No. 04-CV-01360 (LMB)), ECF No. 147; see also Harold Hongju Koh,
Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States Government Perspective, 44
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1147 (2011).

2016] A STATUTORY FIX TO FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

1777

executive and judicial branches, and the Constitution does not provide a
clear answer.23 Therefore, a solution most likely requires action by the
third branch of government: Congress.24 Fortunately, the analogous
history of foreign sovereign immunity provides a useful roadmap to a
pragmatic solution for the current disarray in the doctrine of foreign official
immunity.25 In 1976, after years of uncertainty and tension sparked by a
different—yet surprisingly similar—statement of exclusive power from the
Executive,26 Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act27
(FSIA) and brought order to the immunity doctrine that protects foreign
states and their instrumentalities from suit in U.S. courts.28 The statute was
a remarkable success and serves as a model for the current conflict.29
This Note examines the federal common law of foreign official immunity
in the aftermath of the Rosenberg Statement and suggests a statutory fix for
the current confusion in the doctrine. Part I outlines the modern law of
foreign official immunity and the overlapping constitutional responsibilities
that give rise to conflict between the executive and judicial branches, as
well as the resulting confusion and discord among the courts. Part II
investigates the analogous history of foreign sovereign immunity and its
legislative solution. Part III analyzes the Executive’s foreign affairs power
and its authority to assert control over determinations of foreign official
immunity. Finally, Part IV uses this new understanding to propose a
division of authority between the executive and judicial branches that
employs the expertise and constitutional authority of each. This Note
concludes with an argument in favor of a Foreign Official Immunities Act
and an appendix containing a proposed statute.
I. THE ORIGINS OF DISORDER: CONFUSION AND DISAGREEMENT
IN THE CURRENT FEDERAL COMMON LAW
OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
This part examines the disorder that has arisen in the current doctrine of
foreign official immunity. In 2010, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held
that the FSIA does not apply to the immunity of foreign officials, but left
open the possibility that those individuals could be awarded immunity
under federal common law.30 The Court did not, however, establish how
foreign official immunity determinations should be made.31 In the five

23. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official Immunity,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704, 704 (2012).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332,
1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2012)).
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra APPENDIX.
30. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010).
31. See id.; see also Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and Executive Power, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 885–86 (2011); Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity
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years since that landmark decision, the Executive has asserted primary
control over the doctrine,32 and, predictably,33 the courts have struggled—
and failed—to apply a consistent standard.34 In the summer of 2015, a
court in the Southern District of New York rejected the Executive’s
questionable assertion of control in the Rosenberg Statement and rendered
an immunity determination that was not presented to the State Department
in the first instance.35 The court’s decision highlights one unsettled aspect
of a federal common law doctrine that needs repair.
Foreign official immunity determinations are difficult legal questions
because the doctrine involves both the intersection of international and
domestic law and the competing constitutional demands of the Executive
and Judiciary.36 Moreover, a court determination of nonimmunity in a case
against a foreign official risks ruptures in relations with the official’s
country.37 This is particularly problematic when the foreign country in
question is a powerful one or an important ally.38 Accordingly, some legal
scholars argue that the Executive has a dominant role to play in recognizing
and awarding foreign immunities because the determinations are integral to
U.S. foreign policy,39 and the Executive has plenary power over foreign
affairs.40 Other scholars, however, believe that the Executive has no place
intruding on a legal question that is properly before the courts.41 They fear

Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L.
915, 917 (2011).
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity and Federal Common Law, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 589, 590 (2011); infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part I.C. Courts are split on (1) a foreign official’s right to immunity for
violations of international law, and (2) the amount of deference that is owed to executive
branch suggestions of immunity. Compare Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716, at
*6 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016), and Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773, 777 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“The State Department’s determination regarding conduct-based immunity, by contrast, is
not controlling [and] officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official
immunity for [international law] violations.”), with Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22, 23
(2d Cir. 2014) (“‘[I]n the common-law context, we defer to the Executive’s determination of
the scope of immunity’ and ‘[a] claim premised on the violation of [international law] does
not withstand foreign [official] immunity.’” (quoting Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d
Cir. 2009))).
35. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), 2015 WL
4879070, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015).
36. See Keitner, supra note 23, at 704.
37. See infra Part II.C.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. The argument suffers when executive determinations in favor of (or against)
immunity are used to advance foreign policy objectives because it means that the legal rights
of private party litigants are decided on political and/or nonlegal grounds. See infra Part II.B.
40. See John B. Bellinger III, The Dog That Caught the Car: Observations on the Past,
Present, and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts
Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 825 (2011); Koh, supra note 22, at 1147; see
also Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2014).
41. See Rutledge, supra note 31, at 909; Wuerth, supra note 31, at 975 (arguing that “the
practice of binding executive branch immunity determinations lacks solid constitutional
footing” and “executive control of immunity determinations has demonstrated functional
disadvantages”); see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012).
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that immunities will be granted by the State Department for political
reasons due to diplomatic pressure from allies, for example, or as
bargaining chips with countries that have tense relations with the United
States.42 The underlying concern is that determinations that should be
made by the Judiciary under the rule-of-law end up being discretionary
political calls.43 The resulting conflict produces a muddled doctrine,
unclear standards, and a legal system that leaves parties unsure whether
U.S. courts are available to resolve ordinary legal disputes against foreign
individuals.44 This part examines the recent history of foreign official
immunity to determine how the doctrine deteriorated so quickly—a mere
five years after the Samantar decision.
A. Foreign Official Immunity
As a Matter of Federal Common Law
In November 2004, a class action was filed in the Eastern District of
Virginia against a former high-ranking official of the government of
Somalia.45 The plaintiffs alleged that Mohamed Ali Samantar had
facilitated widespread torture and extrajudicial killing in Somalia in the late
1980s.46 Samantar’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds was granted
when the district court decided that he was an “agency or instrumentality”
of Somalia and entitled to protection under the FSIA.47 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed Samantar’s dismissal and held the FSIA did not
entitle him to immunity because the statute only applied to foreign states
and their nonperson agencies or instrumentalities.48 In 2010, the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the Fourth Circuit.49 The Court’s landmark
decision effectively split the doctrine of foreign immunity into two parts:
(1) the immunity of a foreign state and its nonperson agencies,

42. The year before the Rosenberg Statement’s controversial recommendation of
immunity for the ISI officials, the United States conducted more than sixty drone strikes in
Pakistan and sent a team of Navy SEALs into the country to kill Osama Bin Laden. See, e.g.,
The Data Team, Drone Strikes: Cause or Effect, ECONOMIST (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart-drone-attacks-andterrorism-pakistan [perma.cc/4J74-M3AV].
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. See, e.g., Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016)
(“[T]he district court stayed the case [for more than seven years] until a party could provide
a declaration from the United States Department of State indicating that the action would not
interfere with U.S. foreign policy.”); Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336,
339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (“[T]he Court stayed the case
[for nearly eight months until] the United States Department of State provide[d] the Court
with a statement of interest on the question of whether the Moving Defendants [we]re
immune from suit.”); see also infra Part I.C.
45. See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04CV1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug.
1, 2007), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S.
305 (2010).
46. See id. at *6.
47. Id. at *8, *15.
48. See Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 373, 381.
49. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 326.
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organizations, and instrumentalities—governed by the FSIA;50 and (2) the
immunity of a foreign individual who acts on behalf of that state, agency,
organization, or instrumentality—now governed by standards of federal
common law to be determined by the district court on remand.51
After Samantar, the federal courts that have faced a request for foreign
official immunity have usually reverted to a version of the historic “twostep procedure” that was used to determine foreign sovereign immunity in
the years prior to the FSIA.52 Under step one, the foreign government
could request immunity directly from the State Department.53 If the
Executive decided that immunity was appropriate, the Justice Department
would convey that determination to a court in a statement of interest.54
Prior to the FSIA, these “suggestions of immunity” with respect to foreign
sovereign immunity were binding and viewed as dispositive on the
immunity request.55 But in the years since Samantar, the Second and
Fourth Circuits have split on the amount of deference that should be
accorded to State Department suggestions of foreign official immunity.56
Under step two, the foreign government could request immunity directly
from a court.57 Whether step one was required before a foreign defendant
could proceed with step two remains uncertain, however, because the preFSIA procedure did not clearly divide authority between the executive and
judicial branches.58 Under pre-FSIA federal common law,59 courts were
empowered to decide immunity “in the absence of recognition” by the
Executive.60 But the courts were also required to make that determination
“in conformity to the principles” of the State Department.61 The resulting

50. See id. at 325.
51. See id. at 325–26.
52. See id. at 311; Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 771; Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 3d
486, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
53. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311; see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No.
03-MDL-1570 GBD, 2015 WL 4879070, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012) (“The Solicitor General, or any officer of the
Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the
United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the
United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United
States.”).
55. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“It is therefore
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to
allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.”);
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (“The certification and the request that
the vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the courts.”).
56. See infra Part I.C.
57. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311; see also In re Terrorist Attacks, 2015 WL 4879070,
at *3.
58. See infra Part II.
59. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36 (“[T]he foreign government may also present its claim
of immunity by appearance in the suit and by way of defense to the libel.”); see also
Bellinger, supra note 40, at 832 (“Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, a foreign government
generally had the option to seek a resolution of its sovereign immunity claim either before
the State Department or before the court.”).
60. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 587; see also Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311.
61. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34–35; see also Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312.
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tension and unclear division of control between the executive and judicial
branches was one of the primary issues the FSIA was enacted to resolve.62
After Samantar, this same procedural confusion returned, and the tension
quickly intensified, when the Executive asserted primary control over all
determinations of foreign official immunity and effectively declared that
step one was mandatory before a foreign defendant could proceed to step
two.63
B. The Executive Upsets the Balance
Almost immediately after Samantar, the Executive sought a leading role
over all requests for foreign official immunity.64 In 2011, the year after the
decision, the State Department’s Legal Advisor, Harold Hongju Koh,
declared that Samantar had vested primary control over determinations of
foreign official immunity with the Executive.65 Koh’s interpretation of the
Samantar holding was based on the Court’s dicta that “[w]e have been
given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to
eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding
individual official immunity.”66
The Legal Advisor’s broad assertion of control based on the language in
Samantar is questionable.67 While the Court declared that “the common
law” governed foreign official immunity68 and recounted the historic twostep procedure,69 it did not express an opinion about the appropriate balance
of authority between the Executive and Judiciary and certainly did not
declare that the Executive alone should make foreign official immunity
determinations.70 Nevertheless, the following year, the Justice Department
invoked the same ambiguous language from Samantar to make the

62. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT, with page numbers as reprinted] (“A principle purpose of this
bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the
judicial branch.”).
63. See infra Part I.B.
64. See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.
65. See Koh, supra note 22, at 1141–42 (“In the Samantar case, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held that the immunity of foreign government officials . . . is not controlled by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, but rather, by immunity determinations made
by the Executive Branch.”).
66. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 323.
67. See Rutledge, supra note 33, at 605 (“While the [doctrine of foreign official
immunity] (whether statutory or common law) might take into account the executive
branch’s views (or even defer to them), no area of law to my knowledge depends on the
executive branch’s interpretation to define its very content.”); infra Part III.
68. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325.
69. See id. at 311.
70. See id. at 325–26; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text. In the State
Department’s own report outlining the pre-FSIA common law of foreign sovereign and
foreign official immunity, the Department recognized that “[g]enerally, the foreign state had
the option to litigate its immunity claim before the Department or before the court.”
Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, 1977 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, app. at 1019.
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Executive’s strongest and most destabilizing assertion of authority over the
doctrine to date.71
In April 2012, after Pakistan sought immunity for the ISI and its two
officials, the district court stayed the proceedings and invited the views of
the State Department.72 Seven months later, the Executive submitted the
Rosenberg Statement, a ten-page73 document that declared the ISI immune
under the FSIA and the Pakistani officials immune under the doctrine of
foreign official immunity.74 The statement was prepared by the Justice
Department and was based in large part on a letter from Koh, the State
Department Legal Advisor, to the Justice Department’s Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Stuart Delery.75 In the Rosenberg Statement,
the Executive analyzed the ISI’s immunity request and concluded that the
spy agency was entitled to have the allegations against it dismissed
“because it is a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA and no
exception to immunity applies.”76 The statement also recommended
immunity for the Pakistani officials based on Koh’s “determination of the
Department of State that [the officials] enjoy immunity from suit.”77 The
Koh Letter declared that the “complaint contain[ed] largely unspecific and
conclusory allegations” that only challenged the ISI directors’ “exercise of
their official powers as officials of the Government of Pakistan.”78 “In light
of these circumstances,” Koh wrote, and “taking into account principles of
immunity articulated by the [e]xecutive [b]ranch in the exercise of its
constitutional authority over foreign affairs . . . the Department of State has
determined that [the officials] enjoy immunity from suit.”79
The Koh Letter80 and Rosenberg Statement established a new legal
standard in federal common law and are eerily similar to a famous State

71. See Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 9 n.5.
72. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d
sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014).
73. Compare Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 9–11 (devoting less than three
pages to the analysis of the ISI officials’ common law immunity claim), with Statement of
Interest of the United States at 23–35, Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (No. 05 Civ. 10270 (WHP)) (devoting nearly twelve pages to the analysis of the
Israeli official’s acts and the merits of his immunity claim).
74. Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 11.
75. See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Stuart F.
Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 17, 2012), attached as
Exhibit 1 to Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16 [hereinafter Koh Letter].
76. Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 6. Whether it was appropriate for the
Executive to determine the applicability of the FSIA to the ISI is beyond the scope of this
Note; however, most likely, a court is not required to defer to such a determination because
one of the purposes of the FSIA was “to transfer primary responsibility for deciding ‘claims
of foreign states to immunity’ from the State Department to the courts.” Samantar v. Yousuf,
560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2010)); see also infra Part III.C.
77. Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 1.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2.
80. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 22, at 1152.
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Department letter from sixty years before.81 In 1952, the acting State
Department Legal Advisor, Jack Tate, also sent a letter (“the Tate Letter”)
to the Justice Department outlining new rules regarding the immunity of
foreign states.82 In the Tate Letter, the State Department announced the
adoption of a new and more restrictive policy of awarding immunity.83 The
new policy required a complicated analysis of the nature of a foreign state’s
conduct that was unclear and could sometimes be used to justify immunity
for nonlegal or political reasons.84 The letter caused such confusion that the
Executive itself almost abandoned the new theory.85 As a result, the State
Department and courts struggled to apply the Tate Letter consistently, and
Congress was forced to restore clarity through the FSIA.86
The Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement are just as disruptive. Like the
Tate Letter, they assert a new and mandatory State Department policy that
would empower the Executive with controlling authority over such
traditional judicial tasks as evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint or
analyzing the nature of a defendant’s conduct.87 Combined with the
requirement that all requests for immunity be submitted to the State
Department in the first instance, the statements have inserted an unclear
political element into federal common law that jeopardizes the impartiality
of the foreign official immunity doctrine. The courts are already in conflict.
C. Confusion in the Courts
On September 30, 2013, more than seven months after the Koh Letter
and Rosenberg Statement were filed, the court sided with the Executive and
awarded immunity to the ISI and Pakistani officials.88 The Rosenberg
plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit and argued that the State
Department’s immunity determination was invalid and not dispositive
because the allegations against the ISI officials related to conduct that
violated jus cogens norms.89 The plaintiffs argued that the officials could
not receive immunity—and therefore the State Department’s
recommendation was not controlling—because the provision of material
and financial support to terrorists can never be considered official or state
81. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST.
BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; see also infra Part II.B.
82. See Tate Letter, supra note 81.
83. See id.
84. See infra Part II.B.
85. See Kevin P. Simmons, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the
Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 549 (1977).
86. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 312–13 (2010); infra Part II.B.
87. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
88. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344–45 (E.D.N.Y. 2013),
aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014).
89. See Pasha, 577 F. App’x at 23. Jus cogens norms “are norm[s] accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.” Id. (quoting Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279,
1286 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012).
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sanctioned.90 Therefore, the plaintiffs argued, the foreign official immunity
doctrine does not protect officials who engage in such acts.91
The plaintiffs supported their appeal by citing to Yousuf v. Samantar,92 a
Fourth Circuit decision that was issued a mere ten days before the Koh
Letter and Rosenberg Statement were submitted by the Executive.93 In
November 2012, in a continuation of the same Samantar case the Supreme
Court had decided in 2010,94 the Fourth Circuit declared that State
Department immunity determinations were not entitled to absolute
deference95 and—contrary to the views of the Executive96—foreign
officials were not entitled to immunity for conduct that violated jus cogens
norms.97 When the same argument was used by the Rosenberg plaintiffs at
the Second Circuit, the court rejected their appeal and, splitting with the
Fourth Circuit, stated: “‘[I]n the common-law context, [the Second Circuit]
defer[s] to the Executive’s determination of the scope of immunity’ and ‘[a]
claim premised on the violation of jus cogens does not withstand foreign
[official] immunity.’”98 The Second Circuit’s decision effectively cut
federal common law into two camps.99 After Rosenberg, foreign official
defendants in the Second Circuit are entitled to immunity based on the
views of the Executive. Foreign official defendants in the Fourth Circuit,
however, do not receive such automatic protection because the State
Department’s views regarding conduct-based immunity are not dispositive,
and jus cogens violations are not protectable.100
In the aftermath of the circuit split and less than two years after the Koh
Letter and Rosenberg Statement, another foreign official defendant sought
immunity in the Second Circuit.101 This time, however, no party requested
90. See Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5–6, Pasha, 577 F.
App’x 22 (No. 13-4334-CV), 2014 WL 582901, at *5–6.
91. See id.
92. 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012).
93. See Pasha, 577 F. App’x at 23; Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 763.
94. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
95. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773.
96. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Samantar v. Yousuf, 135 S.
Ct. 1528 (2015) (No. 13-1361), 2015 WL 412283, at *18 (“The court of appeals also
committed legal error in declining to rest its determination of non-immunity on the specific
grounds set forth in the Executive Branch’s Statement of Interest, and instead fashioning a
new categorical judicial exception to immunity for claims alleging violation of jus cogens
norms.”).
97. See Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773, 778.
98. Pasha, 577 F. App’x at 23 (quoting Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009)).
99. Compare id., with Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773, 777, and Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810,
2016 WL 373716, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016).
100. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to resolve the circuit
split. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015) (denying certiorari). The Executive,
which opposes the views of the Fourth Circuit, recommended that the Court deny certiorari
because “[t]he judgment of the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court’s denial of
petitioner’s immunity, is therefore consistent with the Executive Branch’s immunity
determination, and it properly disposes of the immunity issue in this case.” Brief for the
United States, supra note 96, at 12.
101. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), 2015 WL
4879070, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015).
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a statement of interest from the Executive, and the court was forced to
decide whether it was bound by the Rosenberg Statement.102 In August
2013, the former head of two Saudi Arabian charities sought dismissal from
an action brought by the victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
which alleged he had sent financial and other material support to Osama
Bin Laden and al Qaeda in the years prior to the attacks.103 The In re
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001104 plaintiffs argued that the Saudi
official’s immunity request was procedurally improper and should be
denied because the court was not allowed to award immunity that was not
first requested from the State Department.105 After evaluating the
Rosenberg Statement, Samantar, and the history of foreign immunities in
general, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and the Executive’s new
policy.106 The court awarded immunity to the former official based on its
own analysis of the allegations in the complaint and its determination that
the acts alleged were taken in the foreign official’s official capacity.107 An
alternative argument that the Saudi official’s conduct was unlawful, and
thus not entitled to immunity, was also rejected because “[s]uch an
assertion is merely an artful way of implicating the jus cogens doctrine,
which is not recognized by the Second Circuit as an exception to common
law [foreign official] immunity.”108
The court also supported its decision to reject the Rosenberg Statement
by examining two recent district court immunity determinations. In Moriah
v. Bank of China Ltd.109 and Rishikof v. Mortada,110 district courts granted
immunity to foreign officials in cases where the officials had not first
petitioned the State Department.111 The In re Terrorist Attacks court’s
rejection of the Rosenberg Statement remains controversial, however,
because the plaintiffs in Moriah and Rishikof did not raise an objection to
immunity based on the Rosenberg Statement,112 and the In re Terrorist
Attacks plaintiffs did not appeal the Saudi official’s award of immunity to a
higher court.113
The conflict over the Executive’s assertions in the Rosenberg Statement
highlights the need for clarification of federal common law in this area. In
the Second Circuit, State Department immunity determinations are entitled
to absolute deference.114 Therefore, because the Koh Letter and Rosenberg
Statement have only articulated a new State Department policy, In re

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at *3–4.
See id. at *1.
No. 03-MDL-1570 (GBD), 2015 WL 4879070 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015).
See id. at *3–4.
See id. at *4.
See id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6.
107 F. Supp. 3d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
70 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2014).
See Moriah, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 278; Rishikof, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 12.
See Moriah, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 274; Rishikof, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 10–11.
See In re Terrorist Attacks, 2015 WL 4879070.
See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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Terrorist Attacks arguably does not violate Second Circuit precedent.115
But the policy rejection—and the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Yousuf116—is
in tension with federal common law, which, as Samantar declared, should
govern foreign official immunity determinations.117 Under step two of the
pre-FSIA analysis, “the courts may decide for themselves whether all the
requisites of immunity exist . . . in conformity to the principles accepted by
the department of the government charged with the conduct of our foreign
relations.”118 The Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement adopted two new
principles: (1) a foreign official was not entitled to immunity unless and
until the Executive had the first opportunity to decide the request; and (2)
courts are not supposed to determine whether a foreign official acted in an
official capacity.119 Viewed from that perspective, the In re Terrorist
Attacks court’s grant of immunity may have violated Samantar because the
justification for immunity was not a “ground of immunity . . . which it is the
established policy of the [State Department] to recognize.”120
Days before this Note went to press, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed
Yousuf,121 the 2012 decision that the Rosenberg plaintiffs relied on in their
appeal to the Second Circuit.122 In Warfaa v. Ali,123 the Fourth Circuit
denied common law foreign official immunity to another former Somali
military leader accused of committing atrocities that violated jus cogens
norms.124 The Warfaa court avoided addressing the rift Yousuf caused with
the executive branch125 by declaring that the court was bound to apply
Fourth Circuit precedent in the same way the court in Rosenberg v.
Pasha126 avoided the hard question of whether immunity was appropriate
for alleged jus cogens violations by the ISI officials.127 Nevertheless, the
soft circuit split that existed in the aftermath of Pasha has now hardened
and will likely remain until the Supreme Court or Congress resolves it.128
115. In the Fourth Circuit, the Rosenberg Statement’s assertions would probably receive
the same noncontrolling deference as an immunity determination. See Yousuf v. Samantar,
699 F.3d 763, 773, 777 (4th Cir. 2012).
116. Id.
117. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010).
118. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945).
119. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
120. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312 (quoting Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36). But see infra Part
III.C (arguing Hoffman is no longer applicable).
121. See Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016).
122. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
123. No. 14-1810, 2016 WL 373716 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016).
124. See id. at *6.
125. See Brief for the United States, supra note 96, at 18.
126. 577 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2014).
127. See Warfaa, 2016 WL 373716, at *6 (“One panel’s ‘decision is binding, not only
upon the district court, but also upon another panel of this court—unless and until it is
reconsidered en banc.’” (quoting Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642
(4th Cir. 1975))); Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2014) (“We are bound to
follow that precedent, unless and until it is overruled implicitly or expressly by the Supreme
Court, or by this Court sitting in banc.”).
128. If Warfaa is appealed to the Supreme Court, the Executive may once again choose to
recommend that the Court deny certiorari for the same reasons it recommended denial in
Yousuf. See Brief for the United States, supra note 96, at 12. On the other hand, because the
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The law needs clarification. In the five years since Samantar, the
Judiciary has been in a fight with itself and the Executive. Two circuits are
on opposite sides regarding the deference owed to executive determinations
of immunity and the type of conduct entitled to protection. The Executive
has made a weakly supported grab for control over the entire process, only
to have a district court reject that assertion in a way that appears to conflict
with the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the subject. The disarray
is clear and requires a remedy. Fortunately, the history of foreign sovereign
immunity serves as a useful case study.
II. THE HISTORY OF A SOLUTION: FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AS AN ANALOGY TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the President, Congress, and the
Supreme Court worked together to clarify and implement a workable
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine.129 The conflict involved two parts:
the circumstances when a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity for
(1) acts inside the sovereign’s borders; and (2) acts outside the sovereign’s
borders. In 1964, the Supreme Court clarified the first situation when it
reaffirmed130 the federal common law act of state doctrine that granted
immunity to a foreign sovereign for acts performed inside its borders.131
Immunity for acts performed outside the foreign sovereign, however,
proved intractable under federal common law because the analysis was
complicated132 and the division of authority among the branches of
government forced the Executive into “the awkward position of a political
institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the
courts.”133 In 1976, with full support from the State Department, Congress
enacted the FSIA and empowered the courts with exclusive authority to
decide requests for foreign sovereign immunity.134
In essence, a statute was necessary because federal common law was not
able to support a doctrine that awarded immunity to a foreign state for
conduct that occurred outside its territorial borders, because the scope and
State Department did not make an immunity determination in Warfaa, the Executive may
recommend the Court grant certiorari to determine whether it was appropriate for the Fourth
Circuit to “fashion[] a new categorical judicial exception to immunity for claims alleging
violation of jus cogens norms.” Id. at 18.
129. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6605; see also infra Part II.B.
130. See infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
131. Under the act of state doctrine, a foreign sovereign is totally immune from suit in
U.S. courts for all government actions that occur within the sovereign’s territory. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964); see also Natalie A. Turchi, Note,
Restructuring A Sovereign Bond Pari Passu Work-Around: Can Holdout Creditors Ever
Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2171, 2186 (2015) (discussing application of
the act of state doctrine to sovereign debt cases).
132. See infra Part II.B.
133. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6607; see also infra Part II.B.
134. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6604–07; see also Daniel P. Roy III, Note,
(Don’t) Take Another Little Piece of My Immunity, Baby: The Application of Agency
Principles to Claims of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1289–94
(2015) (discussing the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and enactment of the FSIA).
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complexity of the immunity analysis yielded inconsistent results.135
Immunity for acts occurring within a sovereign’s borders is governable by
federal common law under the act of state doctrine because the relevant
inquiry focuses on a straightforward question of locational identity: where
the act occurred.136 Immunity for acts outside the sovereign’s borders is
more complicated because it focuses on the nature of the act: whether the
conduct is considered public or private.137 As a result, immunity
determinations for acts outside a sovereign’s borders often hinge on
particularized facts, and a clear set of guidelines—which a common-law
based doctrine struggles to provide—was necessary to achieve consistency.
As the analogy in this part shows, a common law solution can work for
individual official immunity that is based on nothing more than identity—
such as head-of-state or consular immunity. But immunity that is based on
the nature of a foreign entity’s conduct is too complicated to be governed
by federal common law.
This part examines the disarray that once existed in the federal common
law of foreign sovereign immunity, the solution that was adopted to resolve
that conflict, and the similarities between that history and the current
conflict within the doctrine of foreign official immunity.
A. The Roots of Foreign Sovereign and Foreign Official Immunity
in American Jurisprudence
The reciprocal practice where the United States does not subject a foreign
sovereign to suit in U.S. courts was first recognized as a matter of federal
common law by Chief Justice John Marshall’s historic decision, Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon.138 In 1810, the French Navy commandeered a
privately owned American ship as it sailed across the Atlantic Ocean.139
When the ship’s former owners learned that their hijacked vessel was
anchored in the port of Philadelphia after seeking shelter during a storm,
they sued the French government to recover the ship.140 To their dismay,
the district court dismissed their claim when the Executive intervened and
recommended immunity for the French government.141 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall affirmed the dismissal142 and
established the federal common law of foreign sovereign immunity under
principles of international law and the then-current custom of absolute

135. See infra Part II.B.
136. See infra Part II.A.
137. See infra Part II.B.
138. 11 U.S. 116 (1812); see also Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). The
doctrine of foreign official immunity can also be traced to cases from the 1790s involving an
early form of the conduct-based immunity argument. See generally Keitner, supra note 23, at
749–50 (examining six civil suits brought against current or former foreign officials that
involved statements of interest by the Executive).
139. See Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 117.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 118–19.
142. Id. at 147.
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immunity.143 For more than a century, the judicial branch looked to
customary international law to grant foreign states near-total amnesty from
the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts.144
Almost ninety years after Schooner Exchange, the act of state doctrine
was first introduced. The doctrine extended immunity to all acts of a
foreign state—including the personal protection of an individual—when the
acts were performed inside the sovereign’s territorial borders.145 In
Underhill v. Hernandez,146 an American citizen living and working in
Venezuela during the Revolution of 1892 was detained by a Venezuelan
military leader.147 When the American was freed and returned to the
United States, he filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against the
official for false imprisonment, assault, and battery.148 The district and
circuit courts awarded immunity,149 and the Supreme Court affirmed under
the act of state doctrine.150 Because the Venezuelan official had acted in an
official capacity, and the tortious conduct occurred entirely inside the
territorial boundaries of Venezuela, the Court famously declared that “the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory.”151 After Underhill, federal
common law granted absolute immunity to a foreign state for all acts within
its borders, including the personal immunity of an individual when his or
her actions were considered the acts of the sovereign.152
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, federal common law evolved again
when the Supreme Court started giving tremendous deference to the
Executive in cases involving foreign affairs.153 As the world entered a new
era of global commerce, foreign sovereigns and private individuals began to
interact in more frequent and significant ways.154 In response to a rise in

143. See id. at 136–39; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
486 (1983).
144. See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486; Wuerth, supra note 31, at 924–25.
145. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“The immunity of
individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states, in
the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders,
must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by paramount force as matter of
fact.”).
146. 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
147. See id. at 578–79.
148. Id. at 578.
149. Id. at 583 (“[T]he acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of
Venezuela, and, as such, are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another
government.”).
150. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 254.
151. Id. at 252.
152. See id.; see also In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[I]mmunity is a personal
right. It derives from and remains an ‘attribute of state sovereignty.’” (quoting In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1987))); Statement of Interest, supra note 22, at 7
(“The immunity protecting foreign officials for their official acts ultimately belongs to the
sovereign rather than the official.”).
153. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1913–16 (2015).
154. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6605.
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litigation involving foreign defendants, and the lack of a clear system that
could be used to assert immunity, the Court established the famous two-step
procedure155 that allowed a foreign state to petition the State Department or
a court for a determination of immunity.156 In the aftermath of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins157 and disputes with the Executive over New
Deal legislation, the Court also moved away from federal common law’s
reliance on customary international law and judge-made determinations of
immunity.158 Instead, the Court looked to the views of the Executive and
focused on whether immunity was consistent with the practices and policies
The trend toward absolute deference
of the State Department.159
culminated with two controversial160 World War II-era decisions: Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman161 and Ex parte Republic of Peru,162 in which the
Court declared that immunity determinations by the Executive were
controlling and “must be accepted by the courts.”163
By the early 1950s, the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was an
imperfect blend of executive and judicial authority, but the system worked
relatively well because the law was built on the stable foundation of
absolute immunity.164 Under the absolute theory of immunity, the analysis
focused on identity: if the defendant was a foreign state, it usually was
entitled to immunity. That stability was shattered, however, when the
absolute theory of immunity was replaced by the new restrictive theory.165
Overnight, the doctrine’s bedrock principle of analysis changed, and the law
devolved into a mess of politics, confusion, and uncertainty.166
B. The Tate Letter and Conflict in the Doctrine
of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
In 1952, the United States joined a majority of other nations and adopted
the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.167 The State
Department’s Tate Letter announced that the Executive would no longer

155. See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S.
68, 74 (1938) (“[I]t is open to a friendly government . . . to claim [its] immunity from suit,
either through diplomatic channels or, if it chooses, as a claimant in the courts of the United
States.”).
156. See supra notes 52–61 and accompanying text; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note
62, at 6606.
157. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (limiting the scope of federal common law).
158. See Wuerth, supra note 31, at 926–27.
159. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6606.
160. See infra Part III.C.
161. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
162. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
163. Id. at 589.
164. Tension between the executive and judicial branches was minimal because the
analysis focused on whether the entity requesting immunity was a recognized foreign
sovereign. See, e.g., Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 33–34.
165. See Tate Letter, supra note 81. The absolute theory is also known as the classical
theory. See id.
166. See infra Part II.B.
167. See Tate Letter, supra note 81.
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endorse a foreign state’s assertion of immunity for acts considered private,
commercial, or nonofficial.168 The policy took immediate effect and
controlled immunity determinations made by both the State Department and
the Judiciary.169 This shift, however, complicated the immunity doctrine
because the governing standards that identified conduct that was
“nonsovereign” or “commercial” were unclear and required a careful
analysis of the plaintiff’s allegations.170 The disarray was further
compounded by the holdings in Hoffman and Ex parte Peru,171 because the
branch that had the most expertise evaluating the nuances of “nonofficial”
or “private” conduct172 was bound to accept the immunity determinations of
a highly political branch that lacked “the machinery to take evidence, to
hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review.”173
After the Tate Letter, foreign defendants would often petition the State
Department for a suggestion of immunity under step one of the two-step
procedure,174 then exert political pressure for a recommendation that was
entitled to absolute deference in the courts.175 The State Department
struggled to make impartial decisions, and “[o]n occasion, political
considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity
would not have been available under the restrictive theory.”176 As a result,
politics sometimes interfered with the legal rights of private litigants, and
immunity determinations were made on nonlegal grounds, under procedures
that did not ensure due process.177 Litigants also suffered from a lack of
information because the justifications for immunity were usually short, and
“very often no indication was given as to why immunity was
recognized.”178
The Executive’s inconsistent application of the restrictive theory also had
ripple effects in the courts because judges were required to render immunity
determinations in accordance with the State Department’s unclear
policies.179 Under step two, when a foreign state wanted to avoid political
considerations—or the Executive entirely—it could petition a court

168. See id. (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or
public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).”).
Interestingly, the letter also incorrectly commented on the decisional tug-of-war between the
executive and judicial branches when it observed “that a shift in policy by the executive
cannot control the courts.” Id. at 985; see also supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983).
170. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010); Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487.
171. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
172. See infra Part IV.B.
173. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6607.
174. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
176. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
177. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6606.
178. Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, supra note 70, at 1022;
see also supra note 73.
179. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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directly.180 But courts struggled to apply a clear standard, and due process
concerns persisted as courts were forced to defer to executive
determinations that sometimes broke with clear precedent.181 In Victory
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General182 and Petrol Shipping Corp. v.
Kingdom of Greece,183 for example, the Second Circuit denied immunity on
the grounds that a contract to transport grain was a commercial act. Five
years later, in Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India,184 the same
court was forced to reverse itself and award immunity under nearly
identical circumstances, because the State Department decided that the
transportation of grain was a sovereign act, entitled to immunity.185
For more than ten years, the doctrine limped along. Finally, in the mid1960s, the executive and legislative branches agreed that the law was
broken and a statutory fix was necessary.186 In 1976, after almost twentyfive years of case-by-case determinations made by two rival branches of
government, Congress enacted the FSIA.187 The statute codified the
restrictive theory and placed full authority over foreign sovereign immunity
determinations with the courts.188 It helped free the Executive from
diplomatic pressure to engage in horse-trading for suggestions of immunity
by removing political considerations from the analysis. The FSIA also
helped the courts by placing the law under a set of clear statutory guidelines
to ensure immunity was granted for only legal reasons that were subject to
appellate review.189 It was a remarkable success.190
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Congress had two primary goals when it enacted the FSIA. First, it
wanted to clarify the law by establishing “when and how parties can
maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the
United States.”191 Second, and more importantly, it wanted to eliminate the
disarray in federal common law that necessitated the need for a statute in
the first place by “facilitat[ing] and depoliticiz[ing] litigation against

180. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, supra note 70, at
1019; see also Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487–88.
181. See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487–88.
182. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
183. 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966).
184. 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971).
185. These cases demonstrate the challenge that conduct-based determinations of
immunity present. In some circumstances, an agreement to transport grain is a commercial
act (e.g., a government program that supports for-profit businesses); in other circumstances,
it is a sovereign act (e.g., during a crop failure to ensure enough food is available to a
community). Liability often hinges on a fact-based determination.
186. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6608.
187. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010).
188. See id.
189. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
190. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
in Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 318 (1986).
191. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6604.
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foreign states[,] and . . . minimiz[ing] irritations in foreign relations arising
out of such litigation.”192
Under “the pre-existing common law”193 that the FSIA set out to fix,
immunity determinations represented “a devil’s choice”194 that placed the
United States in a lose-lose situation. Foreign countries could use the twostep procedure to pressure the State Department into awarding immunity in
circumstances that were not consistent with the restrictive theory.195 The
second- and third-order effects of such political or foreign policy-motivated
immunity determinations not only harmed private litigants, but also made
diplomacy more difficult.196 When the State Department engaged in horsetrading or awarded immunity on questionable legal grounds, relations with
third-party states could suffer when those uninvolved states were denied
immunity in the future under similar circumstances.197 The nonreciprocal
nature of the situation also compounded the lose-lose dynamic because the
United States usually could not obtain the same sort of case-by-case
preferential treatment in the justice systems of other countries.198 In the
United States, a decision to deny immunity had significant drawbacks
because foreign states knew that immunity was an option, and the denial
could be viewed as an unfriendly act.199 Likewise, a decision to grant
immunity also had drawbacks because the decision could cause tension
with uninvolved parties,200 make future diplomacy or immunity
determinations more difficult, and negatively impact the ability of a private
litigant to obtain recourse.201 The FSIA corrected that lose-lose dynamic
when it eliminated step one of the two-step procedure.

192. Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of State, and Harold R. Tyler,
Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Carl O. Albert, Speaker, H.R. (Oct. 31,
1975), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 62, at 6634.
193. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010).
194. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 26 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State)
[hereinafter Leigh Statement].
195. See id.
196. See id. at 26–27.
197. E.g., the transportation contracts in Victory Transport and Isbrandtsen Tankers. See
supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
198. See Leigh Statement, supra note 194, at 27 (“In virtually every other country in the
world, sovereign immunity [wa]s a question of international law decided exclusively by the
courts and not by institutions concerned with foreign affairs.”).
199. E.g., in the context of the Rosenberg Statement, if the ISI directors were not granted
immunity, Pakistan could become less cooperative with U.S. interests in the region. See
supra note 42.
200. E.g., after learning that the ISI officials were granted immunity, India released a
statement saying “the decision of the US authorities in this case is a cause of serious
disappointment.” Aditi Phadnis, Expressing Concern: India Disappointed Over ISI’s
Immunity in US Civil Suit, EXPRESS TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/
481746/expressing-concern-india-disappointed-over-isis-immunity-in-us-civil-suit/
[perma.cc/DWV5-2AAA].
201. E.g., the victims of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
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For the most part, the FSIA works remarkably well202 because the
executive and judicial branches work together in a way that employs the
expertise and constitutional authority of each.203 The Executive plays a
minor role through its recognition power and authority to designate state
sponsors of terrorism.204 The courts play the dominant role based on their
expertise interpreting statutes, applying the law, and evaluating the
sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint.205
The FSIA converts a judge-made or political decision into a statutory
interpretation question under straightforward and relatively clear
guidelines.206 The statute awards immunity to a foreign state for all acts,
minus certain specified exceptions such as waiver, commercial activity, or
state sponsors of terrorism.207 While complications sometimes arise over
whether an exception applies, the doctrine is stable and consistent because
the FSIA is interpreted and applied by the courts based on precedent and
subject to appellate review.208 The statute gives the doctrine the stability it
lacked under federal common law.209
The FSIA is also admirable because of its impact on international law
and the immunity doctrines adopted by other nations.210 The statute was
the first of its kind and served as a model for the immunity laws in other
countries.211 Since 1976, many states have actually gone a step further and
codified the immunity of foreign officials in the same statutory structure as
the immunity of foreign sovereigns.212 The United States, however,
appears to be in a situation analogous to the late 1960s and early 1970s: its
doctrine of foreign official immunity is in disarray, while the legal systems
of many other countries have evolved to incorporate the immunity of
foreign individuals under comprehensive and nonpolitical statutory
doctrines.213

202. See Feldman, supra note 190.
203. See infra Part IV.
204. See infra Part III.B.
205. See infra Part IV.B.
206. The FSIA is also interesting because the statute intentionally transfers authority to
the judicial branch. Most of the time, when Congress codifies federal common law under a
new statute, the new law has the effect of limiting judicial discretion. In many ways, the
FSIA does the opposite.
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012).
208. See Feldman, supra note 190.
209. Cf. supra Part I.
210. See Feldman, supra note 190, at 303.
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property (Dec. 2, 2004). As of February 6, 2016, there are twenty-eight
signatories and twenty-one ratifications of the U.N. Jurisdictional Immunities Convention.
The United States has not joined. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3&
lang=en (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/EY72-5W94].
213. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S.
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 232–48, 252;
Rutledge, supra note 33, at 589.
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III. THE GRACEFUL EXIT: AGAINST EXECUTIVE BRANCH MONOPOLY
OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS
The State Department’s role in the doctrine of foreign official immunity
is the subject of much ongoing debate and scholarly work.214 This part
discusses the justifications the Executive has given for that role and its
authority to make the Koh Letter and Rosenberg Statement’s assertions of
control.
In the 2015 decision, Zivotofsky v. Kerry,215 a divided Supreme Court
affirmed the executive branch’s exclusive authority to grant formal
recognition to a foreign sovereign.216 The decision was limited to a specific
situation that did not involve foreign official immunity; but the Court’s
treatment of the proper role of the Executive in matters involving foreign
affairs helps inform the discussion about the proper role of the Executive in
matters involving foreign official immunity because the Executive justifies
its assertions of control by invoking “its constitutional authority over
foreign affairs.”217
Zivotofsky is especially relevant if executive authority over foreign affairs
in the context of foreign official immunity is viewed as a function of its
recognition power.218 The State Department, however, has wisely avoided
making such an argument because the constitutionality of the FSIA,219
which would infringe on that exclusive authority, cuts against the
Executive’s assertions in the Rosenberg Statement.220 Nevertheless,
Zivotofsky’s majority and dissenting opinions cast doubt on the Rosenberg
Statement even under the broader “foreign affairs power,” because absolute
control by the executive branch is extreme and in conflict with the
constitutional system of checks and balances.221
This part examines arguments in favor of executive control. Part III.A
explores federal common law and draws parallels between the two types of

214. See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 40, at 829; Bradley & Helfer, supra note 213, at 258;
Koh, supra note 22, at 1142; Rutledge, supra note 31, at 909; Wuerth, supra note 31, at 975.
215. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
216. See id. at 2086. The vote was six-to-three (Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was
joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan; Justice Breyer filed a
concurring opinion; Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part; Justice Roberts’s dissent was joined by Justice Alito; and Justice Scalia’s dissent was
joined by Justices Roberts and Alito).
217. Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 2. The Executive has also indicated the recognition
power as a justification for control over immunity determinations. See, e.g., Statement of
Interest, supra note 22, at 5–6.
218. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2089; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 213 (1962) (stating
“it is the executive that determines a person’s status as representative of a foreign
government”); Bradley & Helfer, supra note 213, at 258.
219. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1983);
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004).
220. See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 31, at 932.
221. See infra Part III.B; see also Celidon Pitt, Note, Fair Trade: The President’s Power
to Recover Captured U.S. Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the
Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837, 2842–62 (2015) (examining the constitutional balance
of power between the executive and legislative branches).
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foreign official immunity and the two theories of foreign sovereign
immunity discussed in Part II. Part III.B evaluates the scope of the
Executive’s “constitutional authority over foreign affairs”222 through the
lens of Zivotofsky. Part III.C examines Supreme Court precedent and
considers the dual World War II-era decisions223 that the Executive invokes
to assert the binding nature of its immunity determinations. Informed by
this new examination of federal common law, the Constitution, and
Supreme Court precedent, this part concludes that the Rosenberg
Statement’s assertion of total control is inappropriate as well as imprudent.
A. Status- and Conduct-Based Immunities
Foreign official immunity can be classified into two types: (1) immunity
based on an individual’s status, and (2) immunity based on an individual’s
conduct.224 Status-based immunities apply to individuals such as sitting
heads of state or diplomats and extend to the individual based on the unique
position he or she occupies on behalf of the foreign state.225 Conduct-based
immunities, on the other hand, apply to an individual’s acts and are derived
from the foreign state’s delegation of responsibility to the official to operate
within a certain scope of authority.226 Similar to the relationship between
the absolute and restrictive theories of foreign sovereign immunity, the two
types of individual immunity are closely related to each other, but are just
different enough to cause complications with their application under federal
common law.227
Status-based immunity focuses on the identity of the individual and is
similar to the absolute theory.228 Immunity based on status protects a
foreign official if the individual is a member of a certain group—similar to
the way the absolute theory once protected a defendant if it was deemed a
foreign sovereign.229 Conduct-based immunity, on the other hand, focuses
on the individual’s acts and is similar to the restrictive theory that was
codified by the FSIA.230 Immunity based on conduct protects a foreign
official when the nature of the acts in question are “official” or are
attributable to the sovereign. It does not protect an individual when the acts
are considered private or personal—similar to the restrictive theory’s
“public versus commercial” distinction.231

222. Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 2.
223. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); Ex parte Republic of
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
224. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 774 (4th Cir. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66 (1965); Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign
Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 63 (2010).
225. See Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 774.
226. See id.
227. See supra Part I.
228. See supra Part II.A.
229. See supra Part II.A.
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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The similarity of the two types of individual immunity to the two theories
of sovereign immunity helps inform a solution to the current disarray in the
doctrine of foreign official immunity.232 Under the absolute theory, the
system of executive determinations of state immunity worked well partly
because the question that decided whether immunity was appropriate—
whether the defendant was a foreign sovereign—was a question very
similar to recognition and well within the Executive’s scope of authority
and expertise.233 When the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity replaced the absolute theory, the doctrine fell into disarray
because the relevant question was no longer as straightforward.234 Under
the restrictive theory—and in a conduct-based immunity analysis—the
critical inquiry asks whether the acts alleged in the complaint are “official”
or “private.” The problematic nature of an inquiry that evaluates the
nuances of conduct was the very reason the restrictive theory did not work
as a matter of federal common law and had to be codified by the FSIA.235
B. Zivotofsky v. Kerry and Executive Authority
Over Foreign Affairs
The State Department’s primary justification for control over foreign
official immunity determinations is grounded in the Executive’s
constitutional authority over foreign affairs.236 Courts are usually very
deferential to the President in cases that affect foreign policy237 because the
Constitution gives the Executive tremendous power in the context of
foreign affairs, and foreign relations requires “one voice” that “must be the
President’s.”238 The Executive, however, is not given absolute control.239
As with nearly all areas of the law, the Constitution tempers the power it
gives to a single branch through the system of checks and balances.240
Executive control over foreign affairs is limited by congressional authority
over such areas as spending, treaty ratifications, and declarations of war241
and is further limited by the judicial branch’s authority of review.242
Less than a year ago, the Court provided a lengthy discussion about the
Executive’s foreign affairs power. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held
that an act of Congress requiring the State Department to list “Jerusalem,
Israel” on U.S. passports was an unconstitutional intrusion on the

232. See supra Part I.C.
233. See infra Parts III.B, IV.A.
234. See supra Part II.B; infra Part III.C.
235. See supra Part II.B.
236. See Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 7; Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 2.
237. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 153, at 1900.
238. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086.
239. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008); Sitaraman & Wuerth,
supra note 153, at 1902–03.
240. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090.
241. See id. at 2087; see also Pitt, supra note 221, at 2842–44.
242. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 153, at 1902–03.
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Executive’s exclusive authority to recognize foreign sovereigns formally.243
In its discussion, the Court repeatedly observed that the Executive did not
have absolute control over the conduct of foreign relations because the
system of checks and balances gave Congress the authority to act in ways
that limit the Executive’s ability to act internationally.244
The six-to-three decision was limited to the circumstances in question
because the majority and dissent did not agree about whether the passport
requirement implicated the recognition power.245 The case is still helpful to
the discussion about the Executive’s role over foreign official immunity
determinations, however, because of the similar ways in which the majority
and dissent characterized the Executive’s authority over foreign affairs.246
In essence, both sides agreed that the Executive is entitled to deference in
the conduct of foreign relations because in that context, “assurances cannot
be equivocal” and “[f]oreign countries need to know, before entering into
diplomatic relations or commerce with the United States, [information such
as] whether their officials will be immune from suit in federal court.”247
That being said, both sides also agreed that even though the Executive
should have tremendous authority over foreign affairs, that authority is still
subject to checks and balances by the other branches of government.248
Moreover, where the Executive has asserted absolute control over an aspect
of foreign affairs—such as recognizing a foreign state—the Court indicated
that Congress has a responsibility to check and balance that assertion
through its own law-making powers.249
The Rosenberg Statement’s assertion of total control over foreign official
immunity is open to doubt in light of the Court’s analysis of the Executive’s
scope of authority over foreign affairs. While the Executive certainly has
authority to declare an entity a foreign sovereign to which the FSIA or
federal common law could grant immunity, the system of checks and
balances dilutes the Executive’s authority actually to take unilateral action
on that recognition250 because the Executive does not have “unbounded

243. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086.
244. For example, Congress can stymie diplomatic relations by refusing to authorize
funds for construction of an embassy or approve the nomination of an ambassador. See id. at
2087.
245. Compare id. at 2086, with id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and id. at 2118
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 2084 (majority opinion) (stating “[l]egal consequences follow formal
recognition” and recognized sovereigns “may benefit from sovereign immunity when they
are sued”); id. at 2112 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
“[i]mportant consequences are understood to flow from one state’s recognition of another
[such as the ability to] invoke sovereign immunity”).
247. Id. at 2086 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2113–14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(expressing “serious doubts” that the Executive’s recognition power is entitled to absolute
deference).
248. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion); id. at 2107 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2126 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion).
250. See id. at 2088.
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power” over all aspects of foreign affairs.251 The Executive’s authority
actually to act on the recognition it makes must be tempered in some way
by the other branches of government.252 Therefore, an immunity doctrine
where “it is for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine whether
the conduct alleged was taken in a foreign official’s official capacity”253 is
probably too extreme to fit under the scope of the Executive’s foreign
affairs power.
Congress is the most appropriate body to temper the Executive. Under
current federal common law as it relates to foreign official immunity, the
courts are already too deferential to sufficiently check and balance the
Executive’s authority.254 The clearest example of that undue deference can
be seen in the weight that is still given to the pre-Tate Letter decisions,
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, decisions that, after the shift to the restrictive
theory, should no longer control and which one renowned legal scholar
believes “were wrongly reasoned—if not wrongly decided.”255
C. Hoffman and Ex parte Peru Under the Restrictive Theory
of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
While the Executive probably does not have the constitutional authority
to assert the degree of control over foreign official immunity determinations
that it has,256 even if the Rosenberg Statement is retracted, a thorny issue
remains because the Executive can still invoke Hoffman and Ex parte Peru
to achieve a similar outcome.257 Under 28 U.S.C. § 517, the Executive
may, sua sponte, submit a statement of interest in any pending litigation.258
Under Hoffman and Ex parte Peru, the courts are required to defer to
executive branch determinations of immunity.259 Therefore, because
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru appear to be binding,260 the Executive can still
assert control over foreign official immunity determinations in a way that
remains unchecked and unbalanced.
Such a sleight of hand, however, should not be available to the Executive
because Hoffman and Ex parte Peru are not applicable under the restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity and should not be binding on the

251. Id. at 2089; see also id. at 2115–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion); id. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A] sound
structure of balanced powers [is] essential to the preservation of just government, and
international relations form[] no exception to that principle.”).
253. See Rosenberg Statement, supra note 16, at 9–10.
254. See, e.g., supra Part I.C; infra Part III.C.
255. Wuerth, supra note 31, at 921.
256. See supra Part III.B.
257. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 54.
259. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
260. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311–12 (2010) (quoting from Hoffman and
Ex parte Peru); see also Doe v. De León, 555 F. App’x 84, 85 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied
sub nom. Jane Doe 1 v. Ponce De León, 135 S. Ct. 78 (2014); In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590,
599 (9th Cir. 1992); Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1981);
Weixum v. Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37–38 (D.D.C. 2008).
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courts.261 Hoffman and Ex parte Peru were decided in the pre-FSIA era of
absolute immunity when foreign states (and their officials) were entitled to
immunity simply because the states were recognized as foreign
sovereigns.262 Under the absolute theory, mandatory deference was
appropriate263 because immunity depended on identity and/or recognition—
traditional areas of executive branch authority and expertise.264 But when
the Executive embraced the restrictive theory through the Tate Letter and
supported its codification under the FSIA, the Executive waived its right to
the sort of absolute control Hoffman and Ex parte Peru allowed.265
After the FSIA, foreign sovereign immunity is restricted to certain types
of conduct.266 Because the statute vested sole authority in the courts to
make that conduct-based analysis, a suggestion of immunity from the
Executive regarding a foreign state’s immunity should not be binding
because the FSIA explicitly eliminated the role of the Executive from such
That same logic should extend to modern day
determinations.267
determinations of foreign official immunity because the immunity of
foreign individuals flows out of the immunity of the foreign state.268
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru’s mandatory deference under the restrictive
theory is invalid because the decisions applied to immunity under the
absolute theory, and the Tate Letter and FSIA changed the foundational
immunity question.269 If the courts are not required to submit blindly to
executive recommendations of foreign sovereign immunity, it is illogical to
require mandatory deference to determinations of foreign official immunity
that necessitates the same conduct-based immunity analysis that the FSIA
purposefully took away from the Executive.270
While the Supreme Court in Samantar did observe that “[w]e have been
given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to
eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding
individual official immunity,”271 the shift from the absolute theory to the
restrictive theory—that is to say, the Tate Letter, not necessarily the

261. See Wuerth, supra note 31, at 924 (arguing “that the Court’s cursory reasoning in Ex
parte Peru and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman is unconvincing in the light of the text and
structure of the Constitution”).
262. See supra Part II.A.
263. But see supra note 261.
264. See infra Part IV.A.
265. See Wuerth, supra note 31, at 928.
266. See supra Part II.C.
267. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
268. See Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 849 (2011); supra note 152.
269. Mandatory deference to executive determinations of foreign official immunity under
Hoffman and Ex parte Peru is also doubtful because the two cases were actions in rem and in
admiralty—circumstances that are very different from typical foreign official immunity
cases like Samantar and Rosenberg that involve tortious acts by a foreign individual. See,
e.g., Wuerth, supra note 31, at 928.
270. Deference to executive determinations of status-based immunity is still appropriate.
See infra Part IV.A.
271. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 323 (2010).
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FSIA—changed the State Department’s role in determinations of foreign
state and foreign official immunity. Therefore, Hoffman and Ex parte Peru,
which only applied in the pre-Tate Letter era of the absolute theory, and
were partly to blame for the disarray that necessitated the FSIA in the first
place,272 are not applicable in the current era of the restrictive theory.273
IV. THE FIX: THE BEST SOLUTION GIVES
AUTHORITY TO THE EXPERTS
The first step toward solving a problem is admitting that one exists.
Currently, the courts and Executive are locked into an unnecessary and selfdefeating tug-of-war that Congress must acknowledge and regulate.274 The
circumstances are ripe to codify the doctrine under a foreign official
immunity statute because the Executive has overplayed its hand with the
Rosenberg Statement,275 and the resulting disarray should help focus
attention on the problem in a way that compels action.276 For purely
pragmatic reasons, the Executive should unilaterally retract the Rosenberg
Statement’s assertions of control and seek only an advisory role in foreign
official immunity determinations because Executive authority over pending
litigation actually makes diplomacy more difficult.277 In the meantime, the
courts should evaluate foreign official immunity requests in the same
manner as In re Terrorist Attacks and treat Executive suggestions of
immunity as just that—suggestions.278
This part argues in favor of a statute that places foreign official immunity
determinations under a procedure similar to foreign sovereign immunity. A
foreign official immunity statute still would allow the Executive to assert
varying degrees of influence—not control—over judicial determinations of

272. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
273. The Judiciary’s current deference to Hoffman and Ex parte Peru also demonstrates
that a nonstatutory fix, such as the application of customary international law to federal
common law, is not the best way to resolve the current disarray. Cf. Wuerth, supra note 31,
at 975–76.
274. See supra Part I.C.
275. See supra Part III.B.
276. The Executive’s lack of a role in the act of state doctrine provides additional support.
See Bradley & Helfer, supra note 213, at 258 (“[I]n a closely analogous context—judicial
development of the common law governing the act of state doctrine—the Supreme Court has
declined to treat as dispositive the Executive’s views concerning the contours of that law,
and a majority of Justices have also balked at the idea of giving absolute deference to the
Executive in the case-specific applications of the doctrine.”).
277. E.g., Former State Department Legal Advisor Davis Robinson has recounted a story
that underscores the problem with executive control over immunity determinations. See
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 44. In the 1980s, Secretary of State George Schultz
met with Chinese President Deng Xiaoping to discuss payment of Chinese prerevolutionary
debts. See id. During the meeting, President Deng became “highly annoyed” about an
attachment order that was issued against a Chinese 747 aircraft and said, “Why don’t you
just call that judge down in Alabama and tell him to lay off the People’s Republic of China.”
Id. Schultz replied, “Oh, we have the separation of powers, you have to understand.” Id.
President Deng asked, “Well, what is the separation of powers?” Id. Schultz answered, “I’ll
send you my lawyer [i.e., the legal advisor] to explain it.” Id.
278. See supra notes 101–14 and accompanying text.
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immunity279 by: (1) offering its general views on a legal question as an
amicus curiae; (2) arguing in favor of a specific result as an interested party;
or (3) taking specific action within its authority that has ripple effects on the
courts—such as placing a state on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List to
deny FSIA protection,280 or recognizing an individual as a head of state.281
The overall effect of a statute would eliminate the Executive’s ability to
dictate judicial action, such as the Koh Letter’s award of immunity and
dismissal of the ISI officials, for conduct-based immunity determinations
but not for determinations of status-based immunity.282
A. Status-Based Immunity to the Executive
Status-based foreign official immunity determinations are basically acts
of recognition283 that fall under the Executive’s Article II, section 3 power
to “receive ambassadors and other public ministers.”284 As a result,
executive suggestions of status-based immunity are more appropriately
viewed as executive recognitions of immunity that are “‘a quintessentially
executive function’ for which absolute deference is proper.”285 Therefore, a
new statute should vest authority for determinations of status-based
immunity with the Executive.
B. Conduct-Based Immunity to the Judiciary
Determinations of conduct-based foreign official immunity should be
vested with the courts because the judicial branch has the most experience
and expertise in evaluating conduct. Moreover, the history of foreign
sovereign immunity demonstrates that a clear standard, subject to review by
a higher authority, and applied by a nonpolitical body, is the most effective
system.286
Similar to the way the Federal Tort Claims Act287 requires the U.S.
government to take responsibility for “the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment,”288 conduct-based immunity determinations
should force a foreign sovereign to take responsibility for the harmful acts
of its officials.289 When a foreign individual seeks immunity for conduct
279. See Rutledge, supra note 31, at 887.
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012).
281. See supra Part III.A; infra Part IV.A.
282. See supra Part III.A; infra Part IV.A; see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763,
768 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The extent of the State Department’s role, however, depends in large
part on what kind of immunity has been asserted.”).
283. See Rutledge, supra note 33, at 605–06.
284. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see also Keitner, supra note 224, at 71.
285. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 772 (quoting Rutledge, supra note 33, at 606).
286. See supra Part II.C.
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012).
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 268 (“[T]he burden should be on the defendant to
ensure that his or her government is made aware of the legal proceedings[] and intervenes in
a timely fashion.”).
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that he or she performed on behalf of a foreign state, the immunity that is
awarded is best viewed as the immunity of the foreign sovereign because
the actions of the individual are essentially the actions of the state.290
Sometimes, when a foreign official seeks immunity, the analysis that is
conducted is incomplete because it only asks whether the foreign official’s
conduct was “official conduct” in the sense that it could be taken on behalf
of the foreign state. Analysis that only inquires whether conduct could be
official does not determine whether the foreign state actually takes
responsibility for such conduct. Such analysis is problematic because it
does not require the foreign state affirmatively to declare that the foreign
official’s alleged conduct, if proven, was state sanctioned. A foreign
official immunity statute can fix that by requiring a state affirmatively to
extend its immunity before an official is entitled to protection.291
Consider two examples. In Matar v. Dichter,292 an Israeli military
officer was sued for allegedly authorizing the bombing of a building in
Gaza that killed Palestinian civilians.293 The official was awarded
immunity, however, after the Israeli government effectively stepped into his
shoes and took responsibility for the decision to bomb.294 The allegations
of wrongdoing by the official were dismissed because the official’s conduct
was attributable to the state, and under the FSIA, the tortious act that was
alleged in the complaint was a sovereign act entitled to immunity.295
In Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba,296 on the other hand, Pakistan was
never required to take responsibility for the allegations of providing
financial and material support to the Mumbai terrorists.297 The State
Department determined that the ISI officials should receive immunity
because the Executive itself viewed the allegations in the complaint as
official acts.298 Pakistan was not forced to declare affirmatively that, if
proven, the act of providing financial and material support to LeT would
constitute a sovereign act. Conduct-based immunity probably should not be
available to foreign officials without an affirmation by the foreign state to
extend its sovereign immunity over the alleged acts of its officials.299 The

290. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324 (2010).
291. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
292. 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009).
293. See id. at 287; see also supra Part I.
294. Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (“[T]he State of Israel has represented to this Court
that Dichter’s actions were taken ‘in the course of [his] official duties, and in furtherance of
official policies of the State of Israel.’” (quoting Letter from Daniel Ayalon, Ambassador of
Isr. to the U.S., to Nicholas Burns, Under Sec’y for Political Affairs, Dep’t of State (Feb. 6,
2006), attached as Exhibit A to Declaration of Jean E. Kalicki, id. (No. 05 Civ. 10270
(WHP)), ECF No. 19)).
295. See id.
296. 980 F. Supp. 2d 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F.
App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014).
297. See id. at 343.
298. See Koh Letter, supra note 75, at 1.
299. Pakistan would still be entitled to immunity under the FSIA even if it had declared
that the act of providing financial and material support to LeT was official because the

1804

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

ratification process for a foreign official immunity statute would force a
debate over whether the sovereign itself must take responsibility, as Israel
did in Matar and as the United States does under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, or whether the courts may impute responsibility and decide for
themselves when a foreign official is “acting within the scope of his office
or employment,”300 as the State Department did in Rosenberg. The
ratification process would also be an excellent opportunity to resolve the
split between the Second and Fourth Circuits regarding immunity for jus
cogens violations.301
CONCLUSION
A statute that codifies foreign official immunity is good for everyone.
For Congress, it enables oversight of the State Department and protects the
legal rights of private individuals. For the Executive, it eliminates the strain
that foreign official immunity requests currently place on diplomatic
relations. For the Judiciary, it brings order to the law and gives courts and
litigants a clear idea of the legal playing field. A statutory fix also benefits
the weak and marginalized victims of a foreign state who are the litigants
most likely to be harmed by an unclear immunity doctrine because they
most likely cannot compete with the lobbying and legal power of the
sovereign.
History has a habit of repeating itself. The United States should not be
forced to wait another twenty-five years for a statute to resolve disorder
created by executive overreach. Congress must act.

Executive has not designated Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. See supra note 280 and
accompanying text.
300. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012).
301. See supra Part I.C.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES ACT
A BILL
To define the jurisdiction of United States courts in suits against foreign
officials, the circumstances in which foreign officials are entitled to
immunity, the circumstances in which execution may not be levied on their
personal property, and for other purposes.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Foreign Official Immunities Act of
20xx.”
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
For purposes of this chapter—,
(a) Congress makes the following findings—,
(1) In some circumstances, foreign officials, by virtue of the
position they hold on behalf of a foreign state, are
entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States and of the States;
(2) In some circumstances, foreign officials, by virtue of the
actions they take on behalf of a foreign state, are entitled
to dismissal from a civil action brought in the courts of
the United States and of the States; and
(3) In all circumstances, the judiciary is the most appropriate
body to render final and binding determinations of
immunity that affect the legal rights of parties to a civil
action brought in the courts of the United States and of
the States.
(b) The purpose of this bill is to—,
(1) Establish the circumstances in which a foreign official
may be awarded immunity and dismissed from a civil
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
(2) Establish the circumstances in which a foreign official
may be awarded immunity and dismissed from a civil
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted; and
(3) Vest all foreign official immunity determinations with
the courts of the United States and of the States in
conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this chapter—,
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(a) A “foreign official” is any individual who is—,
(1) a natural person;
(2) an officer of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b);
and
(3) neither a citizen of the United States nor of a State of the
United States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of the
United States Code, nor created under the laws of any
third country.
(b) An “officer of a foreign state” is any individual who—,
(1) is an official, so designated by a foreign state as defined
in subsection (c);
(2) acts on behalf of a foreign state as defined in subsection
(c);
(3) acts in an official capacity; and
(4) acts within the scope of his or her official responsibility.
(c) A “foreign state” is any entity that—,
(1) may be awarded immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //; and
(2) seeks to extend its immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. // to the
actions of the individual seeking immunity under this
statute.
(d) The “United States” includes all territory and waters,
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
SECTION 4. IMMUNITY OF AN OFFICIAL FROM JURISDICTION.
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party, the following foreign officials, designated by the
President and while holding the indicated office, shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States for all official conduct taken on behalf of a foreign state
entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act //
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //, except as provided in section 6 of
this chapter—,
(a) sitting heads of state;
(b) sitting foreign ministers;
(c) diplomats; and
(d) members of special diplomatic missions.
SECTION 5. IMMUNITY OF AN OFFICIAL FROM SUIT.
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act, a foreign
official, acting within the scope of his or her office or employment
and on behalf of a foreign state entitled to immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //,
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shall be entitled to dismissal in the courts of the United States and of
the States for all official conduct taken within the scope of his or her
office or employment, except as provided in section 6 of this chapter.
SECTION 6. EXCEPTIONS TO IMMUNITY.
A foreign official shall not be immune under this chapter in any
case—,
(a) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication; or
(b) in which the foreign state has not officially petitioned the
court for immunity on behalf of the foreign official; or
(c) in which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–
11 et seq. //.
SECTION 7. EXTENT OF LIABILITY.
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign official is
not entitled to immunity under section 6 of this chapter, the foreign
official shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances including for punitive
damages.
SECTION 8. COUNTERCLAIMS.
In any action brought by a foreign official, or in which a foreign
official intervenes, in the courts of the United States or of the States,
the foreign official shall not be accorded immunity with respect to
any counterclaim—,
(a) for which a foreign official would not be entitled to immunity
under section 6 of this chapter had such claim been brought
in a separate action against the foreign official; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the claim of the foreign official; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief
exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by
the foreign official.
SECTION 9. SERVICE; TIME TO ANSWER; DEFAULT.
The requirements of service, time to answer, and default shall apply
to a foreign official in the same manner as those that apply to a
foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. //.
SECTION 10. IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT AND EXECUTION OF
PROPERTY OF A FOREIGN OFFICIAL.
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act, the property in
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the United States of a foreign official shall be immune from
attachment, arrest, and execution, except as provided in section 11 of
this chapter.
SECTION 11. EXCEPTIONS TO THE IMMUNITY OR INDEMNITY FROM
ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION.
The property in the United States of a foreign official used for a
commercial activity in the United States as defined in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et seq. // shall not
be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution,
upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State
after the effective date of this Act, if such an exception to immunity
from attachment or execution is not recognized for a foreign state by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act // 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 et
seq. //.
SECTION 12. CERTAIN TYPES OF PROPERTY IMMUNE FROM EXECUTION.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 11 of this chapter, the
property of those individuals designated by the President as being
entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided
by the International Organizations Immunities Act // 22 U.S.C. § 288
// shall not be subject to attachment or any other judicial process
impeding the disbursement of funds to, or on the order of, a foreign
official as the result of an action brought in the courts of the United
States or of the States.
SECTION 13. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid,
the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the
Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
SECTION 14. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall take effect ninety days after the date of its enactment.
DRAFTING NOTES
This statute only applies to natural persons who act in some sort of
official capacity on behalf of a foreign state that is itself entitled to
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Judicial analysis of
a foreign individual’s request for dismissal under this statute should begin
with an examination of the foreign state that has petitioned the court for
immunity on behalf of the foreign individual. If the court determines that
the foreign state is entitled to protection under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, the court should then consider whether the foreign official
is entitled to status-based immunity under section 4, or conduct-based
immunity under section 5. If the foreign official is entitled to status-based
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immunity under section 4, the court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the allegations against the foreign official and must
dismiss the suit. If the foreign official seeks conduct-based immunity under
section 5, the court should engage in a thorough analysis of the merits of the
affirmative defense. If conduct-based immunity is appropriate, the court
must dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Section 4 intentionally omits the requirement that international
agreements be in place prior to enactment of this statute to give Congress
and the Executive the flexibility to modify the scope of status-based
immunity through future international agreements.

